INTRODUCTION
Current research in game theory addresses the question of how players learn to play. At one end of the spectrum, we have the super-rational Ž . Ž . theories of Jordan 1991 and Kalai and Lehrer 1993 , and at the other extreme, we have reinforcement learning models of Mookherjee and Ž . Ž . Ž . Sopher 1994 , 1997 , Roth and Erev 1995 , and Erev and Roth 1998 , in which players have only minimal intellect. The objectives of these inquiries Ž . are mixed, and include i a foundation for an improved equilibrium Ž . Ž theory, and ii a realistic description of human behavior especially in . experimental games whether or not that behavior is consistent with Nash 1 Partial funding of this research was provided by Grant SBR-9410501 from the National Science Foundation, but nothing herein reflects their views. Ray Battalio assisted in the design of the computer interface, Paul Wilson provided statistical guidance, Ernan Haruvy provided research assistance, and Benjamin Craig provided editing advice. I am also indebted to the editor in charge and the referees for constructive suggestions. However, all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.
equilibria. While the super-rational theories require unrealistically strong assumptions, the naive reinforcement models suffer from the opposite sin of assuming players are too limited in their reasoning powers.
The middle ground, in which players potentially have access to decisionmaking rules of varying sophistication and can learn which rules are appropriate in given situations, is probably much closer to the truth and, hence, would provide a far better descriptive and predictive model of human strategic behavior. If all that humans could learn about a game was which action to choose eventually, then nothing would be learned that could be reliably transferred to a different game. There is a clear advantage for humans to learn general rules which could be applied across a variety of games. The highest payoffs will go to those who choose actions that are optional with respect to the true probability distribution of play in the population for the next encounter, which entails being one step ahead of everyone else and, hence, requires flexibility in forecastingrdecision rules. As teachers of economics and game theory, perhaps our greatest contribution is to introduce students to new ways to analyze problems and Ž . make decisions such as Bayes rule . For our theories to continue to exclude such learning would be shortsighted. Ž Some steps in this direction have already been taken Ho, 1997, 1999; Cooper and Feltovich, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1998; Rapaport et . al., 1997; Sonsino et al., 1998 . The purpose of this paper is to take another step towards articulating and empirically testing such middle-ground theories.
Ž . Stahl 1999 put forth a theory of boundedly rational behavior characterized by ''behavioral rules'' and a theory of rule learning based on the performance of these rules. The general model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . A Ž beha¨ioral rule is a function that maps from the available information the . game and any history of play to the set of probability distributions on the Ž . actions available in the game. We also define a probability distribution Ž . over the space of behavioral rules. A random draw from selects a rule, Ž . which given the available information generates a probability distribution on the actions. A second random draw from this latter distribution consti- tutes the chosen action. That action in combination with the choices of others in the population of players produces a payoff. In addition to knowledge of her payoff, the player receives information about the recent choices of the other players such as the recent empirical frequency of choices. This information is used to evaluate the performance of the behavioral rules. For example, the player could deduce the expected utility payoff of each rule against the recent past. Following the process of Ž . evaluating the rules, the probabilities to use the rules are updated. It is assumed that probabilities increase for rules that would have yielded higher payoffs in the recent past, and vice versa. This is the ''Law of Ž . Effect'' in psychology Thorndike, 1898 , and is also the logic behind Ž . evolutionary dynamics Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988 .
Ž . For example, consider a simple space consisting of two rules: 1 ''following the herd,'' in which the current choice probabilities match the recent Ž . frequency distribution of choices, and 2 ''Cournot best response'' to the recent past. Let denote the probability of using the herd rule, so 0 1 y is the probability of using the Cournot rule. A random draw picks 0 one of the two rulesᎏsuppose the Cournot ruleᎏwhich is then used to choose an action, which yields a payoff. Now suppose the player observes the population distribution of choices before having to make her next choice. The player can evaluate the hypothetical payoff she could have received had she used the other rule. If the following-the-herd rule would have yielded a greater payoff, then probability increases, and vice versa. In the next period, a rule is selected according to the updated probabilities.
The first step in operationalizing this conceptual framework is to represent the huge space of potential behavioral rules. Our approach is to posit a small set of archetypal rules and a way of combining these rules to span a large space of plausible and empirically relevant rules. Since initial behavior is crucial to dynamic prediction, we need behavioral rules that are accurate for the initial period as well as later periods. Therefore, we build on the empirically successful level-n theory of bounded rationality Ž .w for one-shot games developed by Wilson 1994, 1995 hencex forth SW . To extend this theory to multiple-period settings, we define history-dependent versions of the level-n rules. For example, the SW level-1 rule yields a noisy best response to the uniform distribution, and its multiperiod extension yields a noisy best response to the recent empirical frequency of play. One interpretation of this rule is that the expected utility of an action against the recent past is a kind of ''evidence'' for that action, with the player tending to choose the action with the most net favorable evidence. This interpretation suggests a large family of ''evidence-based rules'' which we develop in Section 2c. Evidence-based rules are generalizations of level-n rules that also admit Nash behavior, modified versions of fictitious play and adaptive expectations, and mixtures of those rules. While not exhaustive, this family of rules is nonetheless very rich. Moreover, the interpretation of these rules as the result of ''weighing the evidence'' permits a natural interpretation of the learning dynamics as adjusting the weights on the evidence. Ž There are two kinds of learning present in the general model recall Fig.  . 1 . First, the players can learn in the sense of acquiring relevant data but sticking to the same behavioral rule. For instance, the two rules in the Ž above example learn via data acquisition the population distribution of . choices . As another example, in a game against nature, Bayesian updating can be viewed as a fixed behavioral rule that learns via acquiring new data. We refer to this first sense of learning as ''data learning.'' Second, the players can learn by assessing the relative performance of the behavioral rules and switching to better performing rules. We refer to this second sense of learning as ''rule learning.'' Ž . In Stahl 1996 , a simplified version of this model was confronted with Ž . experimental ''guessing game'' data gathered by Nagel 1995 , and the results were very encouraging. As an initial empirical test of the theory Ž . extended to normal-form games, Stahl 1999 used data gathered in an experiment that was primarily designed to test the robustness of the SW results, but since the experiment lasted two periods, the data could potentially provide evidence for learning. While two periods provide barely enough opportunity for learning by participants, the statistical test rejected the hypothesis of no rule learning. On the other hand, the no-rule-learning hypothesis could not be rejected for the majority of participants. This less than stellar individual learning result may reflect the difficulty of measuring learning over just two periods, rather than a falsification of the model. Clearly, more periods of data are needed for more conclusive testing of this model versus alternative models, which motivates the current experiment and paper. Ž . In this paper, we make a small change in the Stahl 1999 specification Ž . of the evidence-based rules Section 2b which improves the fit, and then we estimate the parametric learning model for each participant of the experiment. While such a model with so many parameters has little Ž . practical value, it is quite useful for i addressing the general questions of learning unhampered by the false assumption of homogeneous partici-Ž . pants, and ii characterizing the heterogeneity in the population. From our experimental data, we find that the hypothesis of no rule learning can be rejected in the aggregate and for a majority of the participants. We also find that there are three primary modes in the population distribution of parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory of rule learning and evidence-based boundedly rational rules. Section 3 presents the experimental design and data. Section 4 presents the test results, and Section 5 summarizes and discusses the findings.
THEORY
We begin with a description of the game environment, then present the general theory of rule learning, and finally present the specific family of evidence-based rules and some operational specifications.
a. The Game En¨ironment
Ž . Consider a finite, symmetric, two-player game G ' N, A, U in normal Ä 4 Ä 4 form, where N ' 1, 2 is the set of players, A ' 1, . . . , J is the set of actions available to each player, and U is the J = J matrix of expected utility payoffs for the row player, and UЈ, the transpose of U, is the payoff matrix for the column player. For notational convenience, let p 0 ' Ž . 1rJ, . . . , 1rJ Ј denote the uniform distribution over A. We focus on single population settings in which each player observes the frequency distribution of the past action choices of all the other players in the population. In our opinion, this is a richer and more appropriate setting to study learning than settings in which each player is randomly matched with just one other player in each round and observes the choice of only that other player after that round. The latter setting is an exceedingly difficult setting in which to learn, because not only is the data process nonstationary, but it is also a poor sample of the population statistics until many periods of data are accumulated. Since the data learning task is much harder, sophisticated behavioral rules might not do better than simple rules until the players observe much more data, but Ž . experiments with many periods say 100 or more invite boredom effects and incentive problems. Further, in real-world learning, humans typically have ongoing access to a wealth of information about how other humans have behaved recently. While the pairwise random matching protocol is well suited to test one-shot equilibrium theory, it is not ideal for investigations of rule learning.
The empirical frequency of the other players' actions in period t will always be denoted by p t , and this information is assumed to be available to each player. 2 The first period of play will be denoted by t s 1. It is also players' choices up to period t with the novelty that p 0 is substituted for the null history. Thus, the information available to a player at the begin-
b. The General Theory of Rule Learning t

Ž .
A beha¨ioral rule is a mapping from information ⍀ to ⌬ A , the set of probability measures on the actions A. For the purposes of presenting the abstract model, let g R denote a generic behavioral rule in a family of Ž t . behavioral rules R; ⍀ is the mixed strategy generated by rule given information ⍀ t . The second element in the general theory is a probability measure over Ž . the rules, , t , which gives the probability of using rule in period t. Given the family of behavioral rules R and probabilities , the induced probability distribution over actions for period t is the integral of the Ž t . Ž . behavioral rules over the rule space:
R
It is convenient to specify the learning dynamics in terms of a state variable that is unrestricted in sign and magnitude. To this end, we define Ž . the state variable, w , t , called the log-propensity for rule in period t, such that the probability of using rule in period t is
H
The last element of the general theory is the equation of motion for the log-propensities. The Law of Effect states that rules which perform well are more likely to be used in the future. This law is captured by the dynamic on log-propensities
Ž . where g is the reinforcement function for rule conditional on informa- The reader may be more familiar with a one-parameter dynamic model
. While this one-0 0 parameter model has the desirable property of being asymptotically stable for 0 -␤ -1, it has the shortcoming that we have no reason to believe Ž . that the scaling of expected utility implicit in g is the correct scaling. To Ž . allow for this ignorance, the econometrician would multiply g by a Ž . Ž . scalar ␣ ) 0 and estimate ␣. In our notation, ␤ s 1 y ␤ ␣.
0
Ž . Given the rule space R and initial log-propensities w и, 1 , the law of Ž . motion, Eq. 2 , completely determines the behavior of the system for all Ž . t ) 1. The operational questions are 1 how to specify the rule space, and Ž . 2 how to specify the initial log-propensities.
Ž . An attractive feature of this general model Fig. 1 is that it encompasses a wide variety of learning theories. For instance, to obtain replicator dynamics, we can simply let the rule space R be the set of J constant rules that always choose one unique action in A for all information states. Fictitious play and Cournot dynamics can be seen as very special cases in which R is a singleton rule which selects a best response to a belief that is a specific function of the history of play. Moreover, the general model can include these constant rules, best-response rules, and other rules.
In the next subsection, we introduce the family of evidence-based rules.
c. The Family of E¨idence-Based Rules
We will first present the abstract concept of evidence-based rules, and then present the specific family of such rules that will be used in this paper.
An evidence-based behavioral rule arises from the notion that a player considers ''evidence'' for and against the available actions and tends to choose the action which has the most net favorable evidence given the available information. Suppose we hypothesize a finite number of kinds of Ä 4 Ä 4 J evidence, indexed by k g 0, 1, . . . , K , and let y ' y , a J = 1
vector of real numbers, represent the kth kind of evidence: y ) y jk jЈk means that the kth kind of evidence is more favorable for action j than action jЈ. For example, the vector of expected utilities against the recent ty1 Ä 4 past, Up , could be a kind of evidence. Let Y ' y , . . . , y denote the 0 k Ž . J = K q 1 matrix of evidence. It is important to understand that the evidence is based on the available information ⍀ t , so we should write Ž t . Y ⍀ to be perfectly clear.
Below, we will specify four kinds of evidence, but for now imagine a class of functions that operate on the available information ⍀ t and produce a matrix of evidence. Further, suppose this class of functions is Ž t . parameterized by , and let Y ⍀ ; denote the matrix of evidence given ⍀ t and . How will a player weigh such evidence? Let G 0 denote a scalar k weight associated with evidence y . We then define the weighted evidence
net evidence values, and we should expect that the strategy with the largest net evidence will be most likely to be chosen and vice versa. There are many ways to go from such a weighted evidence measure to a Ž . probabilistic choice function. Like McKelvey and Palfrey 1995 and Ž . Anderson et al. 1997 , 1999 , we opt for the multinomial logit specification Ž . McFadden, 1974 because of its computational advantages when it comes to empirical estimation. The interpretation is that the player assesses the weighted evidence with some error andror adds idiosyncratic values to the expected utilities, and then chooses the action which from hisrher perspective has the greatest net favorable evidence. Hence, the probability of choosing action j is
Note that Eq. 4 defines a mapping from ⍀ to ⌬ A , and hence is a beha¨ior rule as defined abstractly above. With a slight stretch of notation, Ž . we can associate the parameter vector , with a rule g R, in which Ž . case the family of behavioral rules R can be represented by , -space.
Our approach to representing the huge space of potential rules is to Ž . posit a small set of evidences which, when combined as in Eq. 3 and used Ž . in Eq. 4 , spans a large space of plausible and empirically relevant rules. Since the concept of evidence-based rules can be applied to one-shot behavior as well as dynamic behavior, the predicted behavior in the first period of play should be consistent with the predicted behavior of boundedly rational theories for one-shot games.
In one-shot games, SW found substantial support for level-n thinking. A Ž . level-n player believes that all others are level-n y 1 players who believe . . . are level-1 players who believe that all others are level-0 types Ž . who choose randomly. In a repeated guessing game, Nagel 1995 and Ž . Stahl 1996a found substantial support for similar thinking and rule learning. These types were investigated because they correspond loosely to Ž the iterated levels of rationalizability Bernheim, 1984 and Pearce, 1984;  . Ž . see also Stahl, 1993 , and Binmore's 1987 idea of truncated eductive reasoning. It is also reasonable to ask whether a player who seems to use a level-1 rule in a one-shot game would continue to do so in subsequent plays of that game, especially if, say, the level-2 rule would have produced higher payoffs. The evidence-based rules described below are an extension of the level-n theory to a dynamic situation with learning opportunities.
We now posit four kinds of evidence such that each kind corresponds to one of the SW level-n types. The first kind of evidence comes from a ''null'' model of the other players. The null model provides no reason for the other players to choose any particular strategy, so for the first period of play, by virtue of insufficient reason, the belief is that all actions are equally likely. The expected utility payoff to each available action condi-Ž 1 . 0 tional on the null model is y ⍀ ' Up . We can interpret y as evidence 1 j1
in favor of action j stemming from the null model in the initial period of Ž . play with no prior history . Note that if this is the only kind of evidence Ž . given any weight, then the probabilistic choice function, Eq. 4 , would Ž .
0 result in a possibly noisy best response to p , which is precisely the level-1 archetype of SW. Ž . For later periods t ) 1 , the players have empirical data about the past choices of the other players. It is reasonable for a player to use simple Ž . 0 1 w x distributed-lag forecasting: 1 y p q p for period 2 with g 0, 1 .
Letting q denote the forecast for period t and defining q ' p , the following forecasting equation would then apply for all t G 1:
The expected utility payoff given this forecast is y ⍀ ; ' Uq . We 1 Ž t . call y ⍀ ; the ''level-1'' evidence in favor of action j stemming from j1 the null model and prior history.
The second kind of evidence is based on the SW ''level-2'' player who believes all other players are level-1 players. We define the archetypal Ž t Ž .. level-2 player as one whose belief about the other players is b q , t Ž . which puts equal probability on best responses to q and zero probability on all other actions. 5 The expected utility conditional on this belief is Ž t .
Ž t Ž .. Ž t . y ⍀ ; ' Ub q , and we call y ⍀ ; the ''level-2'' evidence in 2 j2
favor of action j. Note that if this is the only kind of evidence given any Ž . weight, then the probabilistic choice function, Eq. 4 , would result in a Ž . noisy best response to the best response to the uniform prior in period 1 , which is precisely the level-2 archetype of SW.
In testing alternative theories, it is very useful to have an encompassing model; thus, we want to incorporate Nash equilibrium theory within the model. Letting p NE denote a Nash equilibrium of G, y ' Up NE provides 3 yet another kind of evidence on the available actions. Note that this kind of evidence is not well defined for games with multiple Nash equilibria. Since the resolution of this multiplicity problem is beyond the scope of this paper, our experimental design uses only games with a unique Nash equilibrium. Again, if this is the only kind of evidence given any weight, Ž . then the probabilistic choice function, Eq. 4 , would result in a noisy best response to the Nash prior, which is precisely the naive Nash archetype of SW.
Finally, we would like to represent behavior that is uniformly random in Ž . the first period i.e., SW level-0 and ''follows the herd'' in subsequent periods. Following the herd does not mean exactly replicating the most recent past, but rather following the past with perhaps some inertia as t Ž . Ž t . w t Ž .x represented by q . Accordingly, we define y ⍀ ; s ln q , so if 0 only this evidence were given positive weight, then the logit formula, Eq. Ž .
t Ž . 4 , would reproduce q as the probabilistic choice function.
Note that a single scalar value of is hypothesized for all its uses in space defines a unique behavioral rule resulting from a combination of the four kinds of evidences. Rule learning within this family of evidence-based rules amounts to adjusting the weights on these four kinds of evidence. For another interpretation, we can rewrite the combination of level-1, w Ž . Ž Ž .. NE x level-2, and Nash evidence as¨Ubp , wherẽ˜1
. Thus, the weighted evidence entails an im-
. NE 4 plicit mixture of the primitive priors q , b q , and p corresponding to the above three models of other players. Each can be interpreted k as the player's point estimate of the proportion of other players who can 6 Ž . In Stahl 1999 , level-1 evidence was defined isomorphically, but level-2 evidence and herd behavior implicitly assumed s 1. In addition to the foregoing defense of having affect all Ž . level-n rules n s 0, 1, 2 , preliminary investigations found a substantial improvement in the fit to the experimental data.
be characterized by each of these archetypal models. Under this interpretation, adjusting the weights can be viewed as learning about those population proportions.
d. Initial Log-Propensities and Transference
An individual player starts with initial log-propensities to use these rules Ž . in period 1, which we denote w , , 1 , and the log-propensities evolve Ž . according to the law of motion, Eq. 2 . It remains to specify this initial log-propensity function. A natural and parsimonious approach is to specify Ž . Ž . w и, 1 as a normal distribution in rule space with a mean , and standard deviation to be estimated from the data. While simplistic, it is Ž a proper prior on the rule space and is compatible when is relatively . small with SW who found that the vast majority of participants appeared to use one rule for a variety of one-shot 3 = 3 symmetric games.
Anticipating the experiment which will consist of two ''runs'' of 15 periods each with one game in the first run and a different game in the second run, we must also specify the initial log-propensities for the first Ž . period of the second run i.e., period 16 . One approach would be to Ž . specify w и, 16 as another normal distribution in rule space with a potentially independent mean and standard deviation. However, this approach would involve the addition of five more parameters. Another approach would be to assume that one initial log-propensity applies to both periods, as if nothing that was learned during the first run is transferred to the second run. A third alternative would be to assume complete transference; i.e., the log-propensity for the first period of the second run is the same as it would be if there had been a sixteenth period of the first run. We opt for a convex combination of the second and third alternatives which requires only one additional parameter, i.e., w , , 16 s 1 y w , , 1 q w , , 15q , 6
where ''15q '' indicates the update after period 15 of the first run, and is the transference parameter. If s 0, there is no transference, so period 16 has the same initial log-propensity as period 1; and if s 1, there is complete transference, so the first period of the second run has the Ž log-propensity that would prevail if it were period 16 of the first run with . no change of game . Note that this approach can be extended to multiple Ž runs with different games with no need for additional parameters assum-. ing a constant transference . Ž . the mean of the participant's initial log-propensity w и, 1 , and is the standard deviation of that log-propensity; ␤ and ␤ are the learning 0 1 Ž . Ž . parameters of Eq. 2 ; and is the transference parameter in Eq. 6 for the initial log-propensity of the second run.
h Ž . Letting , , t N ␤ denote individual h's probability to use rule Ž . Ž t . , in period t with information ⍀ given the nine-parameter vector ␤, the resulting probability of choosing action j is
Then the log-likelihood of s h conditional on ␤ is
Ž . The computation of Eq. 7 entails numerical integration on a grid; details are available from the author upon request.
f. Limit Beha¨ior
Observe that if behavior converges, the limit behavior will be a Nash equilibrium. To see this, suppose to the contrary that empirical frequency converges to a non-Nash limit point. But then the rule which puts infinite weight on level-1 evidence and no weight on any other evidence, since it will generate the best response to the empirical distribution, will perform at least as well as any other rule, and hence will increase in likelihood, thereby moving the empirical frequency away from the non-Nash limit pointᎏa contradiction. However, if there is an upper bound on the evidence weights , then the limit behavior will be a quantal response equilibrium. Ž Further, observe that since in symmetric games when the distribution is . Nash, then level-1, level-2, and herd behavior are all the same all the rules will perform equally well. Hence, if behavior converges, ''rule learning'' will become negligible as time advances.
7 Thus, rule learning will be important only in cases for which behavior does not converge or in the early periods of convergent cases. This fact justifies our focus on rule learning in the ''short run'' and our experiment design.
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Ž . This is reminiscent of the principle, from Stahl 1993 , that ''being right is just as good as being smart. '' 3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND DATA Ž . In contrast to the experimental design of Stahl 1999 , which presented participants with 15 games in each of two periods, the current design presents participants with one game for 15 periods. The former experiment was a follow-up to SW to provide more observations per participant facilitating participant-by-participant estimation of the level-n model, and only secondarily to obtain data to test the learning model. To provide a fuller test of the learning model, we need many more periods of data, but to identify different rules we need strategic variety. That is, we need either Ž a variety of simple games such as the 3 = 3 games of the former . experiments or more complicated games. The second route is better suited for gathering multiperiod data within the time constraints of an experiment.
Ž . With four archetypal rules ) 0 for just one k , we reasoned that an k appropriate 5 = 5 game should be able to elicit distinct behavior for these four archetypal rules as well as ''interior'' rules. We used a computer to search for symmetric games which satisfy the following criteria:
Ž . 1 the first strategy is a strict Nash equilibrium and there are no other symmetric Nash equilibria;
Ž .
2 the second strategy is the best response to uniform;
3 the third strategy is the twice-iterated best response to uniform Ž . i.e., best response to the second strategy ; Ž . Ž 4 the fourth strategy is the response of the ''worldly'' type Stahl . 8 and Wilson, 1995 ; and Ž . 5 the fifth strategy is either strictly dominated or the maximax choice.
Far from giving the evidence-based rule learning theory its ''best shot,'' these criteria create the greatest possibility of falsification: if different rules would produce different observable behavior and the no-rule-learning hypothesis cannot be rejected, then that would be much more damaging than a nonrejection of the null with data in which the different rules do not produce different observable behavior.
In addition, payoffs were confined to be integers from 0 to 99. Searching over billions of randomly generated 5 = 5 matrices yielded about a dozen candidate games.
9 From this group we eliminated games for which the 8 The ''worldly'' type is roughly equivalent to an evidence-based rule with weights s 0.015, 1 s 0.035, s 0.05. Note that 0 is irrelevant for the first-period prediction.
2 3 9 We are not counting the equivalent matrices obtained by permuting the rows and columns. Confining payoffs to be integers leaves 100 25 s 10 50 possible matrices, so random generation ensures statistically adequate sampling of all possible matrices. Ž . Nash equilibrium was very focal because it had a large payoff 80 or more , Ž . or very antifocal because it had a very small payoff 10 or less . Following this selection, the rows and columns were permuted so a particular behavior rule would not be associated with a particular strategy in all games.
The payoffs for the ''row player'' in the four games we selected are shown in Fig. 2 . Payoffs are in probability units for a fixed prize of $2.00 per game. 10 The labels ne, b1, b2, wd, dm, and mx in Fig. 2 denote Ž . Ž . respectively the strategies that satisfy criteria 1 ᎐ 5 above.
Ž . Each game ''Decision Matrix'' was presented on the computer screen Ž . see Fig. 3 . The participant made a choice of a pure strategy by clicking on a row of the matrix, which then became highlighted. In addition, the participant could enter a hypothesis about the choices of the other players, and cause the computer to calculate hypothetical earnings, which were then displayed on the screen. This feature was provided for two reasons. First, three of the kinds of evidence, level-1, level-2, and Nash, require calculation of the expected utility payoff against a prior, and this is difficult in a 5 = 5 game. Second, reducing calculation noise will sharpen the theory predictions, thereby increasing its falsifiability.
After each period, each participant was matched with every other participant and received the average payoff. Following this, each participant was shown hisrher payoff and the aggregate choices of the other participants. The most recent period's data was displayed on the main screen, but participants could access the entire past record with the click of a mouse button. The lotteries that determined final monetary payoffs were conducted following the completion of both runs. Delaying the lotteries avoids the possibility that lottery outcomes bias the reinforcement 1 of rules. The average payment per participant was $28.00 for a 2 -hour 2 session.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were given extensive Ž . instructions both on-screen and read aloud regarding the computer interface, the on-screen calculator, and the manner in which their choices would determine their payoffs. The experiment script is available from the author upon request. All participants passed a quiz on these matters. 10 Binary lotteries might not succeed in inducing risk neutrality. On the other hand, binary lottery payoffs also admit nonexpected utility formulations of preferences as long as people Ž . are probabilistically sophisticated i.e., satisfy the compound lottery reduction axiom and Ž . utility is monotonic in the probability of winning Machina and Schmeidler, 1992 . Under these strong conditions, ''expected utility'' can be replaced everywhere in this paper by ''expected probability of winning.''
FIG. 2. The four games.
FIG. 3. Computer screen.
The experiment consisted of four sessions of 22, 23, 24, and 22 participants. 11 The participants were predominantly upper-division undergraduate students and some graduate students attending the first and second 1995 summer sessions at the University of Texas. Each session consisted of two runs of 15 periods each. In the first run, one of the four games was played for 15 periods, and in the second run, another game was played for 15 periods. The specific order of presentation in the four sessions was Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . II, I , III, IV , IV, III , and I, II respectively. In each run, the first five 11 In two sessions, there was one participant who failed to make a choice in one period of one of the runs. In subsequent periods of that run, the computer excluded that participant's choices when calculating payoffs and the history for the other participants. Consequently, we did not estimate a likelihood function for these participants and did not include them in the above totals. However, when calculating the likelihood function for all other participants, the history of play used in this calculation was the exact history seen on the computer screen, which included the errant participant's choices before his or her mistake but not afterwards. periods were 3 minutes each, and the last ten periods were 2 minutes each.
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Figures 4a᎐h display the empirical distribution of choices for each of the runs. In two runs, behavior converged to the unique Nash equilibrium Ž . 13 S627r2 and S810r2 ; in addition, in S629r2, the Nash equilibrium became the modal response. In all runs except S629r2, the modal response in Ž the first period was the best response to the uniform prior level-1 . Ž . behavior . For the two runs of game I S627r1 and S815r2 , there is a curious persistence of ''cooperative'' behavior in that a large portion of Ž . Ž . participants chose the top row A , which if everyone chose it would yield the symmetric Pareto dominant outcome. While the game is technically a repeated game, it is unusual to observe cooperative behavior in a group Ž this large. Further data analysis revealed that row A was often a best or . nearly best response to the past frequency distribution; indeed, there are quantal response equilibria in the neighborhood of this frequency distribution. Subsequent pilot experiments with different matching protocols designed to frustrate intertemporal effects produced similar data, thereby convincing us that the data used in this paper are not the result of supergame strategies. 
RESULTS
We divide the results into two sections. The first section deals with hypothesis tests, and the second section analyzes the parameter estimates for the individual participants. Computational details are available from the author.
a. Hypothesis Tests
Ž .
Maximizing the log-likelihood LL function for each participant, and then summing over the 91 participants, the aggregate maximized LL is y1896.44. We report in this subsection selected results on hypotheses that 12 These durations were chosen after reviewing the responses to a debriefing questionnaire following a pilot experiment. Fewer than 10% of the pilot participants indicated that they wanted more time. Nonetheless, it is possible that the time constraint could have been binding for some participants and thereby inhibit their ability to use or learn more sophisticated rules. 14 Ž . The alternative matching protocols included i matching each participant with a differ-Ž . ent random sample of 25% of the other participants each period, and ii ordering the participants around a virtual circle and having the effect of one's choice move counterclockwise and only part way around the circle. Further, several intertemporal punishment strategies were hypothesized, tested, and rejected. impose restrictions on the parameters which lower the maximized LL function. These results are summarized in Table I. RESULT 1. The model is informative and fits the data much better than Nash equilibrium theory.
In multiple regression analysis, the F-test for the whole model serves as Ž a test of whether the model is informative i.e., fits the data better than . pure noise . In the context of maximum likelihood estimation, the equivalent test uses the null hypothesis of uniformly random play in all games and periods. This null hypothesis yields an aggregate LL value of y4393.75 Ž Ž. . s 30 = 91 = ln 5 . Since the model is capable of generating uniformly Ž . random play by restricting s 0, s 0, ␤ s 1, and ␤ s 0 , the null is 0 1 a nested hypothesis. Therefore, twice the log-likelihood difference is 2 Ž . distributed with 819 s 9 = 91 degrees of freedom, which has a p-value of less than 10 y587 ; thus, the model is clearly informative. As another benchmark, we also consider the Nash equilibrium model. Of course, in its pure form, it is incompatible with the data because participants often make non-Nash choices. It is more interesting to consider the Nash model extended to include errors. Observe that by setting Ž . Ž . s 0, ᭙k / 3, Eqs. 3 ᎐ 4 define a Nash-based probabilistic choice k function, with the interpretation of as the precision of the participant's 3 expected utility calculation given the Nash belief. The hypothesis that participants make their choices according to this error-prone Nash model can be represented by a parameter restriction on our full model: namely, s 0.25, s 0 for k / 3, ␤ s 1, and ␤ s 0. In other words, this
Nash-based model is nested within our full model as a restriction on seven 15 Ž . parameters. For each participant, we found the , values that 3 maximized the log-likelihood of hisrher choices. The sum over all 91 participants of these maximized LL values was y3917.14. Compared with Ž . the totally random prediction y4393.75 , this is a significant improvement Ž y104 . p -10 with 2 = 91 degress of freedom . However, the full model Ž . Ž y1896.44 is a very significant improvement over this Nash model p -
y486
.
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with 7 = 91 degrees of freedom . In other words, even after adjusting for the large number of parameters in the full model, the full model is astronomically more likely to have generated the data than the Nash-based model. An enhanced Nash model with learning is also rejected.
RESULT 2. We can reject the hypothesis of no rule learning.
Ž .
By rule learning we mean that the probabilities to use rules change Ž . from period to period in accordance with the law of motion, Eq. 2 . The null hypothesis of no rule learning implies the restriction that ␤ s 1 and 0 Ž ␤ s 0, and hence is a nested hypothesis. Note that since becomes 1 . irrelevant, these restrictions entail three degrees of freedom. When we impose these restrictions, the aggregate maximized LL decreases to 2 Ž . y2303.01. Twice the difference is distributed with 273 s 3 = 91 degrees of freedom and has a p-value less than 10 y54 . Thus, we can strongly reject the hypothesis of no rule learning.
Ž . On an individual basis, for 50 of 91 54.9% of the participants, we can reject the no-rule-learning hypothesis. This is an improvement over Stahl Ž . 1999 , where no rule learning could be rejected for only 39.7% of the participants.
As another test, we considered just the restriction that ␤ s 0 while 1 allowing ␤ to be free. The dynamic equation of motion simplifies to
Ž . This hypothesis allows the rule probabilities to change when ␤ / 1 , 0 Ž . Ž . but only by deepening ␤ ) 1 or lessening ␤ -1 the initial log-pro-0 0 pensity differences across rules, completely independent of the perfor-
. When we impose this restriction, the aggregate maximized LL decreases to y2151.30. Twice the difference is distributed 2 with 91 degrees of freedom and has a p-value less than 10 y58 . Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that ␤ s 0 for all participants. participants, we can reject the hypothesis that ␤ s 0. Thus, about half of 1 the participant population appears to have learned which rules were Ž . better. The comparable result in Stahl 1999 was only 19%.
If we had only two dimensions or only a small number of rules, then we could easily present a potentially revealing plot of over time. However, with five dimensions, it is a challenge to present a picture of how changes over time. After an extensive investigation of the modes of the distribution, we concluded that the location of the ''dominant'' mode conveys useful information. Specifically, for each period we identified all grid points for which was within 50% of the maximum for that period, Ž . and computed the -weighted average of those grid points; call this * t U Ž . for period t. Figure 5 displays t , k s 0, . . . , 3, averaged over the 46 k participants with statistically significant ␤ estimates. While aggregation 1 masks individual differences, Fig. 5 sheds light on what rules participants learned. Note that the vertical scale is logarithmic. The initial weight given to the level-2 evidence and the Nash evidence is quite small and increases substantially over time. Indeed, the weight on level-2 evidence increases by as much as 4-fold, while the weight on Nash evidence increases 2.3-fold. This is understandable, since rules with more weight on level-2 evidence yield consistently larger ex post expected utility than other rules, while the aggregated reinforcement of Nash evidence is compromised by the infrequent convergence to Nash equilibrium. These changes are even more dramatic for individuals with above average ␤ estimates. evidences. It is noteworthy that level-1 evidence is devalued during most of the second run when level-2 evidence is augmented.
RESULT 3. We can reject ''Cournot dynamics.'' So-called Cournot dynamics have been popular because of their simplic-Ž ity and explanatory power e.g., van Huyck et al., 1994; Cheung and . Friedman, 1997, and Friedman et al., 1995 RESULT 4. We can strongly reject the hypothesis that the population of participants is homogeneous.
If the population of participants is homogeneous, then there should be a single parameter vector ␤ that applies to all individuals. Estimating the model under this restriction, the maximized LL decreases to y3060.88. Ž This hypothesis is nested within the full model entailing 9 = 90 parameter .
2 restrictions , so twice the difference is distributed with 810 degrees of freedom, and has a p-value of less than 10 y146 . Thus, we strongly reject the homogeneity hypotheses. We also tested and rejected the homogeneity Ž y22 . hypothesis for each session separately the smallest p-value is 10 . This result indicates that even though the full model contains 819 parameters, we have not overfit the data by allowing too many parameters. There are 91 = 30 s 2730 observations, so there remain 1911 degrees of Ž . freedom 21 per participant .
RESULT 5. Each of the nine parameters makes a statistically significant contribution in the aggregate.
To test whether, say, makes a statistically significant contribution in 0 the aggregate, we maximized the log-likelihood function for each participant while holding s 0, and then summed over all 91 participants. value of y1896.44 is distributed 2 with 91 degress of freedom. In this Ž . manner, we tested k s 0, . . . , 3 , , ␤ , and . We did not test s 0 k 1 Ž . due to the singularity of the initial log-propensity function, w и, 1 , at s 0. For tests involving ␤ , see Result 6 below. Table I lists the results.   0 We clearly reject each hypothesis that the corresponding parameter is 0 for all participants. Therefore, we cannot safely drop any of these parameters from the model without a statistically significant loss in explanatory power.
On an individual participant basis, the parameters that are most frequently significantly different from 0 are , , ␤ , and . This suggests 1 1 that the level-1 evidence receives substantial weight, the recent past is used in forecasting the present, rule performance influences rule choice, and learning is transferred across games. We hasten to point out that not being able to reject s 0 for some k k and some participant does not imply that the corresponding evidence could be dropped from the model for that participant because rule learning could cause to become significant over time. weight is on level-1 evidence. The individual parameter estimates for the 91 participants are in the Appendix.
RESULT 6. The distribution of weights has three modes.
We sought a parsimonious means of capturing the distribution of individual parameter estimates. In particular, we were curious about the initial distribution of evidence weights , since they correspond to the SW archetypes. To explore this, we constructed a histogram of the four k estimates using high᎐low categories 17 ; thus, our histogram had 16 cells, shown in Table III .
Ž . We see that the vast majority 73.6% of participants placed little initial weight on level-2 and Nash evidence. With 16 cells and 91 observations, under the null hypothesis of a uniform distribution there is a 95% probability that any given cell will contain 10 or fewer observations. Hence, three cells fail this test, meaning that we can reject the hypothesis of a uniform distribution. Indeed, these three cells contain 58 of the 91 partici-Ž . pants 63.7% .
It is also insightful to ask whether the parameter estimates are distributed uniformly within each of the three dominant cells, the alternative hypothesis being that they are clustered into modes within the cells. To test this, we compare the mean of the estimates in a cell of Table III with the midpoint of that cell and, adjusting for the number of observations, we find that the mean is at least two standard deviations away from the midpoint in the direction of the ''low'' boundary. Thus, we reject the hypotheses of uniform distributions within cells, suggesting instead that 17 Ž . Ž . Using the logarithmic scale, 1 q ln 5r rln 4 G 4 defined the ''low'' category; in other k words, the median or higher grid point was declared low. We adjusted these estimates to take account of statistical significance. the means of each cell characterize a definite mode of the overall distribution. These three modes correspond to three ''types'' of initial log-propen-Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž sities: i ''null'' f 0 for all k , ii level-1 ) 0 and f 0 for all estimation, and we find strong statistical evidence for the three modes close to the mean of the data in the three dominant cells of our crude histogram. Figure 6 presents the estimated density of and with three 0 1 clear modes. Given these three modes, it is natural to look for correlations between these modes and the estimates of the other parameters. The mean estimates of , , ␤ , and for these three modes are statistically indistin-0 guishable. However, we found the learning parameter ␤ to be signifi- cantly larger for the first and third mode. Since it turns out that level-1 evidence is reinforced, it is important that those participants who do not initially put much weight on level-1 evidence eventually learn to do so; hence, it makes sense that ␤ is higher for the first and third mode. We 1 also found that the mean estimates over the 13 other cells of our histogram were significantly higher for and lower for ␤ and . This finding 1 suggests that the 58 participants in the three dominant modes had much Ž . sharper initial dispositions low , tended to respond more to perfor-Ž . mance high ␤ , and transferred more of what they learned across the two 1 runs than the other participants.
RESULT 7. We cannot reject asymptotic stability for most participants.
Ž
. Asymptotic stability requires ␤ -1. For 60 66% of the participants, 0 the estimated ␤ exceeds 1, and the mean also exceeds 1, which seems to 0 suggest explosive dynamics for the majority of participants. 18 We therefore reestimated the model with the restriction that ␤ F 1, and found that we 0 Ž . could not reject the restriction at the 5% level for 69 75.8% of the participants; that is, only one-fourth of the participants appear to have explosive dynamics. On the other hand, the aggregate test for all participants rejects the restriction with a p-value of 2 = 10 y14 .
DISCUSSION
This paper tested a theory of boundedly rational behavioral rules, and a theory of rule learning based on past performance. The boundedly rational rules can be interpreted as weighing e¨idence for and against available actions based on archetypal models of the other players. An econometric model was specified and an experiment was designed to fit and test this model.
Our model fits the data much better than random noise or an error-prone Nash model. We strongly reject the hypothesis of no rule learning and the hypothesis of Cournot dynamics in favor of our model. The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters reveal substantial heterogeneity in the population of participants both in the initial log-propensities over rules and the extent of learning. A statistical test of homogeneity strongly rejects that hypothesis. After exhaustive testing of each of the nine parameters of 18 To ensure convergence of the ␤ estimates, an upper bound of 2.0 was imposed on the 0 range. For five participants, the estimated ␤ hits this boundary, but without the upper 0 bound, the optimization subroutine tended to increase ␤ indefinitely; however, the log-like-0 lihood values increased only negligibly for ␤ ) 2, and the other parameter estimates 0 changed negligibly. Hence, the upper bound is innocuous.
the rule-learning model, we rejected the hypotheses that any one of them could be dropped from the model.
Herd evidence y and level-1 evidence y receive the most initial weight 0 1 Ž . on average. However, one should not conclude that level-2 evidence y 2 Ž . and Nash evidence y are unimportant, since they can become important 3 via learning. The average estimate of ␤ is 1.53, so substantial learning 1 Ž tq1 . can occur. Further, examining the reinforcement function g , , ⍀ , Ž . we found that the ''99% best'' rules in our , rule space generally included high values for and . Knowing that the no-rule-learning 2 3
hypothesis was strongly rejected, there is no doubt that this reinforcement of level-2 and Nash evidence contributed to the success of the model. We Ž . also presented graphical evidence Fig. 5 showing substantial changes in the weight given level-2 and Nash evidence over time, consistent with rule learning and increasing sophistication.
Using a histogram approach and kernel density estimation, we were able to identify three modes in the distribution of the initial evidence weights . This suggests that it might be possible to specify a parsimonious finite Ž mixture model that explains the data as well when accounting for the . difference in the number of parameters .
Ž . While we could not reject asymptotic stability ␤ F 1 for three-fourths 0 of the participants, it may trouble some readers that 25% appear to have explosive dynamics. However, it should be noted that the only way for the Ž probabilistic choice function to eventually put unit mass on one rule such . as the Nash rule is to have explosive dynamics.
An apparent weakness of our learning theory is the implicit assumption that participants evaluate the whole five-dimensional space of rules R and update their rule probabilities accordingly. It might seem more realistic to assume that the players gather incomplete samples of rule performance measures depending on similarity or closeness with the rules recently used. Unfortunately, we cannot directly observe this sampling and evaluation process. On the other hand, rules that are ''close'' in the brains of human subjects are not necessarily those that are close in our parametric repre-Ž . sentation and vice versa . In other words, a rule that involves a large change in the parameter space of our representation is not necessarily Ž . more distant, and hence less likely to be evaluated. Stinchcombe 1997 has shown that artificial neural networks are universal approximators even for arbitrarily small parameter sets; that is, small changes in the parameter weights of a neural network can span a large function space. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that local experimentation in the weight-space of a brain's neural network could in fact span a space of rules as large as and similar to our five-dimensional space of evidence-based rules. 
